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Much economic policy is based on the theory that a market for labor
exists and that it is this labor market that determines employment and
wage levels. Wages decline when there is an oversupply of labor and rise
when there is an undersupply. Focusing on the supply of and demand for
labor, many economists and policymakers believe that low-skill workers
are poorly paid because there is an oversupply of (or lack of demand for)
such workers. They conclude, accord i n g l y, that the key to lifting low
wages is to provide education and training programs so that workers can
upgrade their skills and join the ranks of high-skill workers, who are in
g reater demand. Many economists and policymakers are reluctant to
i n t e rf e re with the workings of the market, although many feel that in
addition to pursuing education policies, government could also invest in
i n f r a s t ru c t u re and technology. They believe such investments impro v e
the long-term performance of the economy, which will generate higher
average living standards that will “trickle down” to low-paid workers.
James K. Galbraith challenges this theory. He argues that there is no
such thing as a market for labor; rather, what exists is a job structure—a
set of status and pay relationships in the economy within and between
firms and within and across industries. The elements of the job structure
a re far more complex than simple supply and demand for labor hours.
Wage levels are determined by a process of relevant comparisons
involving such factors as workers’ skills, job history, and reputation; job
characteristics; and occupation and industry. Neither workers nor jobs
are close substitutes for one another, as the labor market theory argues.
Therefore, one cannot make systematic statements about the effects of
changes in supply and demand.
If one accepts that what exists in the economy is a job structure rather
than a labor market, then one can see that policies that focus solely on
labor supply and demand will not be effective. Because there is no longer
any reason to associate any particular value of unemployment with rising
wages and hence with rising prices and inflation, theories regarding the
natural rate of unemployment and other barriers to full employment
disappear. The notions that full employment might lead to inflation or
that unemployment is a means of controlling inflation do not hold under
the job structure theory. Galbraith points out that once we discard the belief that wage levels are
d e t e rmined by the market, we are left facing the fact that questions
regarding what people should be paid are political ones. What should be
the distribution of income? How much should secretaries be paid relative
to their bosses? How much should a chief executive officer be paid?
These are not market questions. We cannot deal with these questions
t h rough economic policies based on labor market theories. We must
confront them head on and accept them for what they are—politically
difficult questions that many would prefer not to address. 
The same is true of questions re g a rding education, infrastru c t u re, and
environmental protection. Advocates have attempted to use economics
as a source of support for investment in these areas, asserting that such
expenditures will lead to improved economic performance and competi-
tiveness. Galbraith argues that while investment in education, infra-
s t ru c t u re, and the environment is important, it is not important for
economic reasons. Such investment is necessary and valuable for social
and political reasons, for its contribution to society’s qualify of life, but
he finds little evidence that it will provide dramatic economic benefits.
If our goal is to achieve a more equal society, to raise living standards,
then we must focus directly on full employment and distributive issues
involved in income diff e rentials and adjustment, investment, intere s t
rates, debt stru c t u re, and trade. We cannot be distracted by side issues
and theories of a nonexistent market process. Summary  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
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C o n t e n t sDuring the last decades many economists and policymakers have
a p p roached employment in terms of its assumed relationship to infla-
tion. If one assumes that wages and employment are determined solely
by the operation of supply and demand curves for labor, then the level of
employment is seen as creating upward or downward pressure on wages
and, therefore, on prices and inflation. Belief in the labor market theory
leads to the fear that low unemployment can result in inflation and the
notion that unemployment can be used as a means to control inflation.
James K. Galbraith asserts that labor is not a commodity that is
governed by market rules and that policies based on this assumption are
m i s d i rected and ineffective. Policies that promote unemployment will
do little more than hurt working Americans who are already experi-
encing growing wage inequality despite the recent period of economic
expansion.
Solutions to the wage problem based on the theoretical construct of the
labor market focus on reducing the supply of or increasing the demand
for low-skill workers. Supply is reduced by providing education and
training to transform workers into high-skill laborers. Demand is
i n c reased by boosting economic perf o rmance in the hope that gro w t h
will lead to the creation of more well-paid jobs. Galbraith concludes
that such supply and demand policies are not and cannot be effective in
solving America’s problem of income inequality because wages are not
set by variations in supply and demand, but by a complex set of social
relations he calls the job structure. If he is right, then policies aimed at
equalizing the distribution of income must be entirely reassessed.
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G a l b r a i t h ’s structural theory has implications for monetary policy as
well. His conclusion about the nature of the NAIRU implies that it can
no longer be used as a benchmark by the Federal Reserve. It appears that
the Fed has, indeed, accepted this, or it likely would have moved to raise
interest rates at some point during the last several months of steady or
declining unemployment. Despite Chairman Gre e n s p a n ’s re c e n t
disavowal of the idea of a fundamental shift in the economy’s structure,
the Fed’s inaction (as of October 1997) belies that statement.
Galbraith’s structural theory challenges economists and policymakers to
look beyond constraints on policy that have resulted from the market
a p p roach. The search for solutions to the wage problem must be
extended to encompass questions of what wage diff e rentials should be
and how income and wealth from productivity gains should be distrib-
uted. Viewed from the structural perspective larger problems of growth,
employment, and equality can no longer be resolved by market means;
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An intellectual dichotomy underlies the way most economists are taught
to think: Macro is macro, and structure is microeconomics. This conven-
tional view leads to the common ground on policy that has come to
permeate economics from the liberal center to the far right. According
to this common ground, one set of instruments defines macroeconomic
parameters, while another assures that “markets work,” for example, by
p roviding training and infrastru c t u re, by removing distortions in 
p e c u n i a ry incentives, and by removing barriers to the efficient adjust-
ment of prices.
The deep constraints on the economic policies of the Clinton adminis-
tration illustrate the consequences of these ideas. Mod e rn market-
oriented liberals can favor labor training, education, adjustment
assistance, and other programs that help workers move from one job to
the next. They can favor a wider distribution of education and skills
because equalizing initial chances in the labor market will supposedly
work to equalize final outcomes. They can support public investments in
i n f r a s t ru c t u re because these are said to contribute to the intern a t i o n a l
competitiveness of the economy. On the same ground, they can support
research and development assistance to advanced enterprises and efforts
to open foreign markets to American products.
These are supply-side measures. Their purpose is to improve the long-
term performance of the economy. The thought is that a more produc-
tive economy will generate higher average living standards. The further
thought, that these higher standards will “trickle down” to low-paid
production and service workers, is left as an assumption. It is an assump-
tion that has so far proved unfounded, for such supply-side policies
Unemployment, Inflation, and the
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have so far achieved nothing to reduce economic inequality; either the
dose is too weak or the remedy itself is ineffective. Yet liberals have no
other recourse as long as they remain wedded to the theore t i c a l
construct of the “labor market” and are therefore obliged to leave that
market’s choices about employment and pay fundamentally beyond the
direct reach of public action. 
Nor can macroeconomic policy come to the rescue, for it is a peculiar
f e a t u re of mod e rn macroeconomics that in the conservative limit, it disap-
pears. That is, if all of the canons of the new classical economics hold—
monetarism, rational expectations, and market clearing—macro e c o n o m i c s
ceases to exist except as a blown-up version of micro. Aggregate supply
and demand models behave exactly as micro supply and demand mod e l s ,
yielding an aggregate labor market that clears at the natural rate of unem-
ployment and without disturbing the income distribution decided by eff i-
cient micro markets. The message to the policymaker is “Hands off . ”
To be sure, even conservative policymakers do not completely abandon
macro responsibility and historical experience. Partly this is contact with
reality—one might say gut instinct—and partly it is the influence of
ideas, such as those concerning rigidities, externalities, and public goods,
that compromise the purist position, violating one assumption or
another in a quest for a context within which limited macro e c o n o m i c
action becomes possible. So an asymmetric debate over macroeconomic
policy lives on in practice—asymmetric because those advocating inter-
vention must acknowledge that their grounds are ad hoc, impure, theoreti -
cally problematic, a matter of coarse pragmatism at best. Acceptance of
the broader conservative theoretical stru c t u re reduces macro e c o n o m i c
policy to a fringe role, that of large-scale intervention only in deep and
lasting recessions. In all other circumstances, the macro authorities are
warned off and the active pursuit of full employment disappears from the
list of respectable policy goals.
My dissent does not labor under these policy constraints, either macro or
micro, for I have come to reject the macro-structure dichotomy on theo-
retical grounds. To acknowledge the full extent of my here s y, I have
come to believe that the core analytical categories of microeconomics—
s u p p l y, demand, price, and quantity in flow markets for current inputs
and outputs—have little bearing on the most important policy questionsand that many policy measures directed at improving the performance of
such markets are misconceived. The markets that truly matter are either
asset markets, for which the rules are quite different, or, as in the case of
the “labor market,” not markets at all but a set of social relations, a social
matrix, that we may call the job stru c t u re. And the policies that tru l y
matter, both for aggregate performance and for distribution, are mainly
macroeconomic.
The “Labor Market” and the Theory of the Natural Rate
The concept of the labor market completely colors thought and arg u-
ment on the relationship between employment, unemployment, wages,
and inflation. But what is the labor market? What does it mean in
principle to say that the labor market is tight or slack or in equilib-
rium? These notions rest on the familiar underpinnings of supply and
demand, which enable us to make fast and intuitive connections
between quantities and the movement of prices. For instance, a slack
labor market is one in which labor is in excess supply (there is unem-
ployment), and, there f o re, there is downward pre s s u re on the real value
or purchasing power of the money wage. A tight labor market is one in
which labor is in excess demand, and, there f o re, real wages are rising.
The problem is that these connections, fast and intuitive though they
a re, are theoretically unfounded and empirically wro n g .
Now, in general terms, a market is defined by the plausible presence of
demand and supply curves, which is to say, of schedules of price and
quantity, of bids and offers, on both sides of the transaction. It is this,
and only this, that makes possible systematic statements about the
e ffects of change (such as “a decrease in price will raise the quantity
demanded”). Such statements are plausible in the case of, for example,
apples (even though there are many varieties and grades of apples) and
fish (though an even wider variety exists) because in the aggre g a t e
different apples, or different fish, are reasonably close substitutes for one
another. Therefore, we can plausibly imagine prices adjusting in response
to shortages and surpluses or changes of consumer mood.
The labor market—especially when considered as an aggregative entity
covering an entire region or country—has n e v e r been a market in this
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sense. Each individual worker brings a complex package of characteris-
tics, skills, job history, and reputation to each possible job match. In
comparison with the scope of diff e rences between jobs, the range of
substitutability for each person is extraordinarily narro w. While people
do change jobs, after an early age most never change from one line of
work to another. Jobs themselves are, perhaps, not so complex as the
people who hold them, but they, too, are highly differentiated. Neither
individuals nor jobs are close substitutes for one another. 
The idea that people can readily be switched from one line of work to
another would appear to stem from the idea that labor time is a
commodity with a coherent meaning, and this notion is an extension of
n i n e t e e n t h - c e n t u ry abstractions about labor that have lost their slight
purchase in real world conditions over the course of the present century.
The manual worker with general skills hired out by the day for odd jobs
at a negotiable wage is a fringe case. Everybody else is linked to a social
network that dictates within broad bands terms of employment specific
to his or her skills and background. The small actions that lend intuitive
plausibility at the micro level to the concept of a market for fish
(“Atlantic Salmon $5.99! Special Today!”) are never observed in the so-
called market for labor. Wages are not set in response to the short-term
variations of supply and demand, but rather by a complex process of rele-
vant comparisons, within and across occupations, industries, and the
characteristics and qualifications of the worker.
Most economists seem to have forgotten that John Maynard Keynes
quite powerfully demolished the “supply curve for labor” in the opening
pages of The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and Money. Keynes
showed that there was no reason to expect that, say, an excess of unem-
ployment would drive down real wages. He showed that even with high
unemployment, the remaining workers would still rationally resist reduc-
tion of their money wages; moreover, even if their resistance failed, the
subsequent fall of money wages would bring down prices, leaving re a l
wages unaffected. Thus, labor markets do not respond like fish markets
to excess supply. The “second postulate” of the classical doctrine, the
supply curve for labor, failed as a logical construct, and Keynes threw it
away, drawing an instructive analogy to the overthrow of Euclid’s axiom
of parallels. But, of course, the nonexistence of a viable supply curve implies
that the market for labor itself is not a market in the meaningful sense of thatThe Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 13
term. Without a supply curve, there is no market, and the “equilibrium”
of wages and employment cannot be determined in it. One is forced to
look outside the classical confines of the labor market to find the deter-
mination of employment and of wages. In other words, one needs once
again to build a macroeconomic, and specifically a Keynesian, theory.
The notion of a labor market is essential to coherence of the idea of a
“natural rate of unemployment,” around which so much macroeconomic
policy discussion unhappily turns. What is the natural rate of unemploy-
ment?
1 It is the idea that there exists an organic equilibrium of the labor
market, a single level of unemployment that is consistent with any
constant, unchanging rate of inflation. The natural rate is what its name
implies: the rate given by the free operation of markets, blessed by the
Invisible Hand, graced as equilibrium in the Walrasian sense that once
achieved neither excess supply of nor demand for labor may disturb it. 
Thus we have had, in effect, a Holy Grail for policy guidance. Above the
natural rate (or below “potential output”) disinflationary pre s s u res are
p re d i c t e d .
2 Below the natural rate (or above potential output) infla-
tionary pressures will be found. In the long run growth of employment at
the natural rate of unemployment governs the sustainable pace of non-
inflationary employment growth. Until quite recently all of this has been
amazingly noncontroversial. The only issue has been whether, on rare
occasion, the economy might be so far above the natural rate that a little
boost, in the form of countercyclical stimulus, can be justified to speed
the return to the natural rate equilibrium. 
For the naturalists, the answer is naturally no: the economy will return
to the natural rate on its own and at the optimal speed. For strict natural
raters, doing nothing is always and everywhere the right prescription. For
the slightly more liberal breed we may call the NAIRUvians, the persis-
tence of unemployment above the natural rate is a legitimate possibility.
It may reflect a failure of relevant markets to clear with satisfactory
speed, a disorder that NAIRUvians acknowledge to be possible. That
being so, there may be no harm in policy measures to speed the return to
the NAIRU as long as a “soft landing” at the NAIRU is carefully 
engineered. For NAIRUvians, the issue of whether the economy is or is
not near the NAIRU thus carries a policy significance that it does not
for natural raters. However, that policy significance is so slight that overPublic Policy Brief
the past 30 years of erratic economic perf o rmance and unemployment
occasionally as high as 10 percent, the community of economists has
never coalesced into a strong voice in favor of expansionary policy. In
better times, such as the present, the debate is entirely centered on the
question of when to start restricting economic expansion and slowing
the reduction of unemployment. There is absolutely no room, anywhere
in this spectrum, for the advocate of sustained full employment.
If you happen to think that the performance of the American economy
is on the whole poor—too much poverty or unemployment or inequality,
for example—and that something ought to be done about it, what place
is there for you under the macroeconomists’ tent? The natural
rate/NAIRU answer is no place at all. Policies to attack social problems
belong in the micro sphere: education and training, infrastru c t u re ,
welfare and welfare reform. The frustration that this produces, as when
training is provided for jobs that do not exist, goes unaddressed.
And if the concept of an aggregate labor market could be wiped at a
stroke from the professional consciousness, what would happen? Plainly,
there would then be no reason to associate any particular value of the
unemployment rate with rising wages and hence with rising prices and
inflation. The concepts of the natural rate and the NAIRU, alre a d y
embattled because of the failure of empirical predictions based on them,
would certainly collapse. Economists would be obliged to find ways of
evaluating the evidence governing both inflation and unemployment
without granting privileged status to the idea that the two are closely
linked. The policy notion that unemployment is a sensible means of
controlling inflation would lose most of its power.
I believe this would be an enormous intellectual improvement, for it
would divert research from the ephemeral pursuit of abstract and elusive
scalars (Where is the natural rate, exactly? 6.0 percent? 5.5? 5.0?) into
the analysis of a much more complex realm of data, such as already char-
acterizes the more productive veins of re s e a rch in labor and financial
economics. It would also expand the scope of acceptable policy discus-
sion. It would turn many thousands of unemployed, now abandoned to
fate, into reasonable candidates for reemployment on reasonable public
or public-private projects—physical, intellectual, and cultural—at
reasonable terms. But for this to happen, it is evidently not enough justThe Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 15
to raise doubts about the labor market theory of aggregate wages. For 
if wages are not determined in the labor market but in context- and
institution-specific patterns, what exactly are these patterns and how are
they to be made into legitimate objects of social inquiry?
The Job Stru c t u re
The Danish prince missing from the Hamlet of much modern economic
thinking is the job stru c t u re. Mesmerized perhaps by the magic word s
“adjustment,” “eff i c i e n c y,” and “equilibrium,” economists actually tell
themselves that a theory cannot be good unless it purges itself of any
rigidities, institutions, and other context-specific or ad hoc c o n s i d e r a-
tions. Thus criteria of esthetic conformism come to rule. It is a peculiarly
biased mind-set, and one that bears little resemblance to scientific prac-
tice as one normally understands it. Sure l y, if social stru c t u res exist in the
real world, they deserve to be analyzed, rather than treated with disdain.
What is the job stru c t u re? It is a historically, socially, and politically
specific set of status and pay relationships in the economy, within and
between firms, within and across industries. I will assert here that a job
structure always exists, and has to exist, in every society. Otherwise, rela-
tive pay would be wholly underdetermined—market forces being insuffi-
cient to do the job of setting wage rates and job characteristics—and
chaos would prevail. I also assert that elements of the job structure are
familiar to almost every worker, for one need only analyze the compo-
nents of one’s own pay—occupation, industry, seniority, performance—
to see a part of it. The analytical challenge is to come up with a cohere n t
description of the whole thing—a task that it is not so straightforw a rd .
Job structures may be more or less flexible at different moments of time.
They are obviously not immune to pressures from markets or the fluctua-
tions of the business cycle. But they have the effect of distributing those
p re s s u res across themselves (like shock waves hitting a building).
Occasionally a stru c t u re may collapse under pre s s u re, but for the most
p a rt the effect of having stru c t u re is to slow down changes and to
distribute them in ways that may not appear predictable to those focused
intently on market characteristics. Yet because structures are well under-
s t o od by the people within them, their existence lends coherence andPublic Policy Brief
legitimacy to the economic world. Indeed, a stable and accepted struc-
ture of wages is one thing that distinguishes a politically stable society
from an unstable and disordered one. 
A structural approach to relative wage determination starts from the
proposition that patterns of demand and supply do not solve the labor-
pricing problem. Demand for labor, undergraduates are told, is governed
by the marginal productivity of labor, by the inverse re l a t i o n s h i p
between the amount of employment offered and the value of the output
p roduced in the last hour worked. Wages differ within the marg i n
because jobs differ: hard and dangerous work must be compensated,
human capital accumulation rewarded. 
T h e re are at least two fatal difficulties with this. The first is that the
mechanism for determining marginal productivity in a differentiated job
structure no more exists than does any meaningful market for marginal
workers. Firms do not calculate marginal value, and natural selection
does not work as many economists casually suppose. There is even little
reason in the empirical world to accept that the marginal value of output
actually does fall as employment increases.
Second, imperfect markets are ubiquitous, leading to the well-recognized
phenomenon of labor rent, or payments to artificial scarcities induced
along industrial lines by law or technology or labor unions or winner-
take-all phenomena. The notion of labor rents is a backdoor way into an
analysis of the job structure. But it quickly takes over the whole show.
For labor market theory to subsist alongside labor rent theory, it remains
essential that the nonrent element of labor compensation be a significant
fraction of the total wage. If a very large part of wages are in fact
compensation for the rental value of specific human capital (cf.
B l a n c h f l o w e r, Oswald, and Sanfey 1996), then the aggregative labor
market simply dissolves. Segmentation rules and the patterns of distribu-
tion of labor rent, which are in no way uniquely determined, become the
prime object of analysis. If market forces per se do not dictate exact
outcomes, they can at best act as influences within a social matrix
governed substantially by other things.
Once the possibility of multiple solutions to the labor-pricing problem is
admitted, then the choice between possible solutions becomes, veryThe Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 17
quickly, a matter of historical developments and social relations. In other
work, Paulo Calmon and I (Galbraith and Calmon 1994, 1996) have
outlined a set of pro c e d u res for dissecting the social stru c t u re and for
identifying its largest and most prominent groupings. Our groupings are
p reeminently industrial and policy related. Our pro c e d u res are quite
general and can be used with other types of data. In a forthcoming book
(Galbraith 1998) I will extend and refine this analysis using additional
techniques and a more comprehensive set of industrial and service wage
and performance data. 
The effect of this work is to focus attention on power gro u p i n g s ( a n d
membership therein) and far, far away from the economist’s typical pre-
occupation with rates of return to individual acquisition of skill. It is to
identify a matrix of quasi-political relationships, a job structure, a set of
patterns of monopolism and market power, whose elements change only
slowly over time. And it is to illustrate the overwhelming importance of
m a c roeconomic policies and events for the diff e rential perf o rmance of
groups situated differently—supported differently, protected differently—
in the world economy.
Calmon and I identified six major industrial groups in the American job
structure: an advanced technology group with some associated members
whose position was protected by trade policy; a heavy industry gro u p ,
whose fate varied with the auto contract; a light industry group; a textile
group; a garment-making group, in deep competitive trouble; and a large
residual group of no distinguishing characteristics. We show, for
example, the rise and decline of labor power in the heavy industry
sectors (autos, construction equipment); the steady rise and immunity of
relative wages in advanced technology and protected industries (aero-
space, chemicals, agriculture); the collapsing position of more weakly
o rganized workers in sectors exposed to international trade (light
industry, apparel). We found a number of important special cases—steel,
computers—whose wage paths were subject to special influences. Job
structures are complex.
3
Our work has relevance to the long-running debate over the effects of
technology and trade on the inequality of relative wages. There now
exist many studies that attempt to explain the dramatic rise in the
inequality of before-tax wage and salary incomes over the last twoPublic Policy Brief
decades. A common conclusion of many—notably Juhn, Murphy, and
P i e rce (1993) and Bound and Johnson (1992), endorsed in derivative
works by Krugman (1994) and the Council of Economic Advisers (1994,
1995, 1996, 1997)—is that changes in technology have changed the
distribution of real returns, raising them for those with advanced skills.
In particular, the vast spread of computers into the culture has captured
the attention and imagination of these scholars and has created in the
wider community the suspicion that a new apartheid has come into 
existence, between those who are electronically literate and those who
are not.
4
Our work initially caused us to weigh in on the side of those who argued
for a much larger role for trade and a smaller one for technology in rising
i n e q u a l i t y, a viewpoint notably advanced by Wo od (1994). We have
since come to realize that our analysis does not imply a causal link
between rising trade and rising inequality. Rather, it raises the question
whether the influences of trade and technology can really be separated,
as the main line of the debate would have it, with technology working
t h rough “skill bias” on the demand side of the labor market and trade
through expansion in the effective supply of unskilled labor and factor
price equalization.
What we suggest instead is that technology and trade affect wages as part
of a realignment of power, whose fundamental cause is a weakening of
workers in consumer goods industries relative to workers in industries
supplying capital goods. The fundamental cause of that, in turn, is condi-
tions of slow growth, high unemployment, and stagnating demand in
consumer industries over two or three decades, in the context of increas-
ingly strong market positions for enterprises based on advanced tech-
n o l o g y, notably in such industries as aerospace, communications, and
p h a rmaceuticals and also the special case of computers. The re l a t i v e
degree of technology-based monopoly power of the advanced sectors, in
other words, depends inversely on the prosperity of other sectors that do
not enjoy a similar degree of technical advantage. International trade, in
this interpretation, is the extension of this (predominantly interindus-
trial) rivalry across a fro n t i e r, with the main impact on import -
competing sectors coming through employment effects on the one hand
(as Wood indeed argues) and through threat mechanisms on the other.The Jerome Levy Economics Institute of Bard College 19
This view of the job stru c t u re as primarily governed by the effects of
l a rge forces on relative power extends into the services sector. The
Galbraith-Calmon analysis showed that there appear to be linkages
between some service wages and what is paid in associated manufac-
turing sectors. The path of wages in shoe stores resembles that in leather
manufacture more than it resembles that in grocery stores, which in turn
resembles the path of wages in the breweries and bakeries. This sort of
finding increases confidence in the importance of a job stru c t u re; a
conventional labor market theory would not predict it. 
Supply-Side Liberalism Reconsidere d
Political liberals can happily agree that expenditures on education,
training, re s e a rch, development, and infrastru c t u re are generally good
things in social terms. Unfortunately for liberals, however—and here I
choose my words with precision—economics is not the helpful source of
s u p p o rt for these policies that many liberals, and liberal economists,
p rofoundly hope it might be. There is little direct evidence that
i n c reased expenditures on education, infrastru c t u re, and re s e a rch help
the measured perf o rmance of the economy in any definite way. The
belief that they will do so is essentially an act of blind faith, an assertion
mediated by the theology of the market. Once one moves away fro m
belief in labor supply curves, the effects of supply-side policies on
economic performance must be reexamined.
The educational system of the United States is unquestionably deficient
in important respects. It includes large public school systems in which
resources are starved and education is said not to occur. These failings
are a social and political tragedy and a cultural crime. They have much
to do with the persistence of race-based differences in the earnings and
opportunity structure.
But do they matter, much, for the a v e r a g e level of economic perf o r-
mance? Are American schools a drag on productivity? T h a t q u e s t i o n
t u rns on whether there is a shortage of s k i l l e d labor in the pre s e n t - d a y
United States. There is no such shortage! To the contrary, our economy
is full of highly educated and skilled people. What it is short of is jobs forthose people, as every college counselor and every coordinator of a
training program knows. 
This cannot be surprising. We have not for decades created large numbers
of truly good jobs. And in a country where business interests have such a
huge influence over education policy as they do here, it would be bizarre
if high schools, colleges, and universities were undersupplying business
markets. Much as one might like to believe that improving our educa-
tional system will improve, say, the average rate of productivity gro w t h ,
t h e re is little coherent reason to believe that this is so.
5
G o v e rnment R&D and export assistance helps American companies
penetrate foreign markets, increase market share, improve technological
competitiveness—and pay higher wages. But here there is another
problem. Who benefits from these policies? The number of workers who
work directly in export-oriented, high-technology manufacturing sectors
is small, not over 6 million by a generous count. They are the primary
beneficiaries and they, at the top of the manufacturing wage ladder, are
already comparatively well paid.
Workers and consumers outside the favored sectors benefit at most indi-
re c t l y, for example, from the multiplier eff e c t s of increased export earn-
ings and from the spread of new technologies into products that
consumers use. But this process also has losers—the workers whose skills
become obsolete and whose jobs disappear. Those who argue for tech-
nology policies often forget about this damage. And with no full
employment policy, retraining for these workers is at best a distraction.
There is surely a role in general terms for science and technology policy.
Ultimately and all in all, new technologies lead to a better life. But they
do not and cannot bring full employment nor do they bring about a
f a i rer and more just social ord e r. Quite the contrary, they tend to
strengthen the strongest and richest elements of the industrial structure. 
F i n a l l y, public works expenditure is the historical cornerstone of liberal
i n t e rventionism. Public works are the fastest, most direct way to put
the unemployed to work. They have direct and multiplier effects on
total employment. They have the side benefit that the works them-
selves remain useful for many decades after they are completed. They
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also re p resent in political memory the triumph of liberalism in the first
New Deal. 
But the liberal supply-siders make an entirely different claim for public
works spending. Renaming it “infrastru c t u re” (as I, too, have done on
many occasions), they argue that it contributes in definite ways to the
productivity of the private business economy. The jobs created directly,
in doing the work, are immaterial to this argument. What matters is how
the finished work contributes indirectly to cost reduction and output in
the private sector.
The evidence for such effects rests almost entirely on aggregative statis-
tical relationships, essentially on the bare fact that measured prod u c-
tivity growth declined during the years that saw falling gross public
investment. Almost no evidence rests on detailed analysis of the contri-
bution of particular projects to business efficiency (a high-tech boom in
Appalachia following the Great Society’s road programs there, for
instance). That kind of evidence would be much more persuasive, but it
d o e s n ’t exist. And, on reflection, it isn’t surprising that it doesn’t .
E x p o rt-oriented American manufacturing enterprise is not seriously
h a m s t rung by infrastru c t u re problems. Roads, railroads, electricity, and
water service are adequate to its needs. Boeing is not short of runways
f rom which to launch its planes, and Silicon Valley is not suff e r i n g
b rownouts. Telephones work well in this country. Pollution costs—a
serious matter—do not fall on private business producers, but mainly on
their neighbors. Given a choice, many businesses would prefer to live
with pollution than to have the government pay for clean-up projects;
still less are they interested in paying themselves.
The unpleasant conclusion is that the liberal mainstream has been, to a
d e g ree, fooling itself. Education is important for social and political
reasons and not for the reasons of competitiveness and productivity that
are usually cited. Business doesn’t need a uniform system of top-quality
schools; business would not support such a system, and it is wishful to
a rgue to business that it should. Public works and enviro n m e n t a l
spending are undoubtedly of enormous need and value. But to whom? To
the American citizen, as an element in the standard of living. Roads,
water, sewer, power, and communications systems are all durable public
consumption goods. It is consumers and workers, not in the main business shippers, who hit the potholes on the road to work. It is people
who breathe the air, drink the water, and boat on the rivers and lakes.
That this has little to do with international competitiveness and p rod u c-
tivity growth is sad, but true.
The implication is that pro g ressives must find a language in which 
to defend education, public works, and the environment for their
inherent worth. They must find ways to organize the people in support of
such programs for the vital direct benefits they bring (as indeed the envi-
ronmental, consumer protection, and health and safety movements have
traditionally done). Otherwise these causes will continue to lose the
budget battles. And if citizens want full employment and a more equal
s o c i e t y, the country needs something else. A high-growth, full-
employment macroeconomics, for example, with associated measures to
guard against destabilizing distributive conflicts and the resulting risks of
inflation. Nothing less, nothing indirect, nothing based on the abstract
mechanisms of a nonexistent market process, stands the slightest chance
of working.
The Job Stru c t u re and Policy
What then is the meaning of the job structure for economic policy? As
the job structure replaces the labor market, the received wisdom about
natural rates and barriers to full employment fades away and with it the
excuse for ducking the basic task of reaching and holding full employ-
ment. Subsidies to education, training, infrastru c t u re, and scientific
re s e a rch must be designed and evaluated on their social and political
merits; it becomes inadequate to justify them on a blanket supply-side
assertion that they will help productivity or competitiveness and inde-
fensible to assert that they alone can take care of the larger problems of
growth, employment, and inequality.
Equally fundamentally, the issue of the appropriate differentials between
groups returns to the political context. What should garment workers be
paid relative to auto workers (or to lawyers)? What should secretaries be
paid relative to their bosses? How much is it acceptable for a chief exec-
utive officer to earn, not just in terms of the health of the company he
works for, but in terms of the health of society? More bro a d l y, what
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between the bottom and the top? Between high risk–high return and low
risk–low return? Between capital and labor? Between skill and no skill? If
these are not market questions, they are and must be political questions
that should be faced squarely despite the immensely difficult ethical
questions that they inevitably raise.
Political issues have to be resolved by political means. Collective
b a rgaining is one such means, income and wealth taxation is another,
and minimum wages are a third. If these are not available, something
else has to be devised. The Keynesian guidepost policies of the 1960s
w e re an explicit eff o rt to influence wage stru c t u res, and despite the
oblivion into which they have since disappeared, it may be that they
were a critical element in the huge comparative macroeconomic success
of those years. 
A structural approach to relative wages also has implications for anti-
inflation policy, as long understood by the older generation of labor
economists in the United States and by trade unions who established
c o o rdinated or solidaristic wage bargains in Japan and Europe in the
postwar period. In Latin America in the 1980s, national approaches to
the wage bargain have been a feature of every stabilization effort, notably
the comparatively successful Cruzado and Real Plans in Brazil and the
Pacto de Solidaridad in Mexico, which held things together until they
w e re blown apart by the debt strategy that led to the PRI election
victory in 1994 and the peso crisis immediately after. (For an analysis of
rising inequality in Brazil, Mexico, and the United States, see Calmon,
Conceicao, Galbraith, Garza Cantu, and Hibert 1997.) 
A key question concerns adjustment of the wage structure. By what prin-
ciple should real wages change? Surely, on average, at the rate of produc-
tivity growth, but should productivity gains be distributed to the
individual, to the industry, or to the economy as a whole? 
A structural perspective points to a general pre f e rence for stru c t u r a l
stability, once (if!) a reasonable consensus about appropriate differentials
has been reached. It is probably better to distribute productivity gains as
broadly as possible, to make them largely social rather than industrial or
individual. It is clearly better to avoid arbitrary perturbations to the
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and some groups are better indexed than others. A discre t i o n a ry,
prospective indexation scheme could prove a useful tool in keeping the
structure stable (see Galbraith 1989 for details).
What of employment? If structure stabilizes relative wages and neutral-
izes wage pressures percolating backward from growth sectors, there is no
longer any inflationary labor market barrier to full employment. The
reserve army of the unemployed loses its function, both because the wage
structure remains stable without it and because the stabilization of the
income stru c t u re removes the incentive for employers to maintain a
climate of fear. The issue is there f o re not how many jobs but who to
employ and on what and for how many hours? The issue of who to train
and for what function may have some importance, but much experience
holds that people train themselves when they have an incentive (such as
g o od conditions and decent pay) to stay on the job. At present the
economy is short of jobs, not of skills.
Stabilization of private investment demand would remain a central
m a c roeconomic issue related to employment. Countercyclical public
investment is a possibility, using revolving funds as a finance facility for
states and localities. The Swedes used to accomplish the trick with
private business through tax policy, allowing tax-free deposits of profits
into blocked accounts during booms, to be released for tax-free invest-
ment in slumps. This seems more reasonable than countercyclical profits
taxes, which might do the stabilizing trick at investment levels too low
to assure full employment. Progressive taxation of distributions and real-
ized capital gains—a consumption tax aimed at the rich—seems worth
exploring despite the obvious tendency of tod a y ’s politics to go in the
other direction. Given ratchet effects and leakages to imports, counter-
cyclical consumption boosters, like general income tax cuts, seem the
wrong way to go.
Alongside stabilization of investment demand one has to think of tech-
nological renewal. It makes sense to shut down pro g ressively the back
end of the capital stock, for environmental, safety, and competitive
reasons. Properly designed regulation can help. At the same time, a
flatter wage structure and bigger safety net would reduce the cost of job
loss and the resistance from affected workers.
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m a c roeconomic function. They should serve instead to arbitrate the
distribution of income between debtors and creditors, capital and entre-
p reneurship. They should there f o re be stable and low. Real rates of
return on money should be zero. There is also no reason why long-term
rates of interest in real terms should exceed the long-term real gro w t h
rate of the economy; indeed, they should lie below the growth rate,
effecting a gradual redistribution of wealth away from the creditor and
toward the debtor class and a long-term stabilization of household and
company balance sheets. Speculation in fixed asset markets, an ancillary
risk, should be heavily taxed.
If nominal wages rise in line with prod u c t i v i t y, average prices will be
stable outside of shocks to nonwage elements of cost. Commodity stock-
piles could help curb the shocks. If debt creation is well regulated in the
aggregate, there is no harm in relying on low nominal interest rates to
keep the class structure in order. Difficulties in the debt structure can be
weathered through a modest upward tilt in nominal prices and wages. As
Congressman Henry B. Gonzalez has well said, zero inflation is for the
graveyard. 
Trade bears watching under structuralism, particularly as persistent
deficits in the current account can undermine the political commitment
to full employment. I am reluctant to impose barriers to trade, for tech-
nological reasons: too much structure, too little creative destruction, and
one ends like the Soviet Union. On the other hand, industrial develop-
ment strategies clearly matter. The more advanced industries are, the
fewer production workers they need, the more service workers the
economy can aff o rd, and the higher the national standard of living 
relative to the world. Equally, the more public goods consumption rela-
tive to private goods, the fewer imports are needed for a given living
standard and the fewer exports one is obliged to do. A high-technology,
high-export development path requires attention to stabilizing aggregate
demand in overseas markets and particularly in the developing world,
w h e re there has been catastrophic indiff e rence to this problem in the
past 25 years.
All of this is not to denigrate the traditional liberal emphasis on educa-
tion, infrastructure, and the environment; it is only to question whether
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economic policy. Indeed, unless accompanied by a successful economic
policy that produces full employment and strong growth in government
revenues, it seems certain that these causes will continue to lose the
budget battles, as well as fail to achieve the larger economic results that
their advocates sometimes promise.
It may seem unrealistic to propose these polices now, but the point is
that there is no good in thinking half-thoughts or agreeing to half-
m e a s u res from the outset. The liberal microeconomic supply-side can
p e rhaps make itself useful by getting a little money into education,
training, infrastru c t u re. But the point is to raise living standard s ,
i n c rease security and leisure, provide jobs that are worth having. And
one cannot do that while the grand viziers of macroeconomic policy are
left free to disrupt output and employment and to redistribute income
from working people to the rich. 
N o t e s
1.  In economics, terminology is a marker. If you say natural rate of unemploy-
ment with a straight face, you have as good as declared yourself a fellow
traveler of what used to be called the Chicago school. If, on the other hand,
you persist in using the ugly acronym NAIRU—nonaccelerating inflation
rate of unemployment—then you are a re t rograde American Keynesian,
open to the thought that, in the short run and within strict limits of
p rudence, government policy can sometimes reduce unemployment. The
space between these competing terminologies has virtually defined the
m od e rn debate among full-blooded academic macroeconomists in the
United States.
2.  The etymology of these two terms, the natural rate and potential output, is
in fact quite different, but that is another story. 
3.  They also change with time and are refined with more detailed information.
My 1998 book modifies the Galbraith-Calmon scheme considerably, but
preserves and strengthens the essential insight on the key role of policy and
macroeconomic forces in relative wage determination.
4.  This same idea has also spread to the aberrant quarters of the political
culture, where it surfaces in Charles Murray’s notions about an IQ elite and
Newt Gingrich’s proposals to subsidize laptops for the poor.
5.  Indeed, reduced classroom sizes and other necessary measures to impro v e
schooling are labor intensive and actually reduce measured “productivity,”
for whatever that measure is worth.
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